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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SAMlJEL R. THURMAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ELDON EDWARD PARTRIDGE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 8807 
This is an appeal from a decision by Joseph G. Jeppson, 
Judge, Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
Utah granting judgment for the defendant and against the 
plaintiff of no cause of action on the complaint. This case 
was commenced in the City Court for Salt Lake City, Utah 
where it was tried and a judgment was entered in favor 
of the plaintiff. The defendant then appealed to the Third 
District Court where the case was tried to the court setting 
without jury. 
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The claims of plaintiff arise from a two automobile 
collision which occurred on February 18, 1956 at the inter .. 
section of Cleveland Avenue and Major Street in Salt 
Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah. Immediately prior 
to the collision plaintiff was operating his automobile in a 
northerly direction on Major Street and the defendant 
was operating his vehicle in a westerly direction on Cleve .. 
land A venue. 
Major Street and Cleveland Avenue are each two lane, 
surfaced streets with dirt or gravel shoulders and there 
being no curbing boardering either street. Facing the traf .. 
fie on Cleveland A venue was posted and erected "Yield 
The Right of Way" signs such as are erected throughout 
Salt Lake City. Upon the common or southeast comer 
there was situated a house and trees between the house 
and the south edge of Cleveland Avenue and the east 
edge of Major Street. 
The time of the collision was approximately 11:20 a.m. 
Upon the morning, prior to the collision, snow had fallen 
and was six inches deep on the ground and upon the two 
streets and in the intersection of Major Street and Cleve .. 
land Avenue. It had ceased snowing at the time of the 
collision. 
Plaintiff testified that he was familiar \Vith the inter .. 
section, the fact that there was a "Yie}d .. Right...af .. Way'' 
sign against Cleveland Avenue traffic (TR30) and that 
he drove the street daily because he lived a short distance 
south of the intersection and he took this route to go to 
his work. 
Plaintiff approached the intersection from the south at 
a rate of speed between 20 and 25 m.p.h. (TR. 25) when 
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he was 25 or 30 (TR. 27) feet from the inter~ection he 
first observed the dc·fendant's auto approaching frorn the 
east (TR. 25). At this first observation defendant was 
traveling at 15 m.p.h. (TR. 47) and slowing down (TR. 2o, 
TR. 29, 4 7). At this first observation of the defendant by 
plaintiff, defendant's automobile was 50 feet east of the 
intersection (TR. 27). 
Plaintiff was firn aware of danger when his auto was 
just entering the intersection and when defendant's vehicle 
was approximately even with the "Yield" sign (TR. 28, 
Exhibit, TR. 47); plaintiff tried to gain speed but his 
wheels were sliding (TR. 29) and defendant attempted to 
apply his brakes bur he could not stop because of the 
snow (TR. 49). 
The impact took place with the front end of defendant's 
auto (TR. 30) colliding with the middle of the right side 
of the plaintiffs (TR. 30). At the moment of impact the 
plaintiff's auto was in the center of Major Street with 
the front edge of his automobile at the north edge of the 
intersection (TR. 28). 
Prior to the collision the defendant first noticed the 
plaintiff's automobi1l' when he was at a point even with 
the "Yield'' sign and when the front of his vehicle was 20 
feet from the east t:dg.~ of Major Street. Defendant ob~ 
served the plaintiff at this time and plaintiff was 20 feet 
south of the south edge of the intersection (TR. 49). De~ 
fendant attempted to brake, but the brakes were ineffectual 
because of the slippery road and defendant attempted to 
turn, but this, too, proved ineffectual (TR. 49). 
The defendant w:1..; aware of the generally snowy con~ 
dition of the street all the way from State Street to ~Aainr 
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Street (TR. 49). Defendant had observed the "Yield" sign 
well before he got to the intersection and knew that it 
was a "Yield--Right--of--Way" sign. 
The trial of the above case was commenced at 2:00 
P.M. of November 20, 1957 and at the end of the afte·r .. 
noon of that day the parties rested their cases and argu--
ment by the respective counsel was set for hearing the next 
day at 10:00 A.M. of November 21, 1957. 
That immediately prior to the hearing of Arguments 
by counsel the trial judge made the statement to counsel 
for both parties that he was "ready to decide the case" 
whether counsel for plaintiff was ready to argue his case 
or not at 10:30 A.M. of November 21, 1957. 
While on the bench and as a preface to the Arguments 
of counsel which commenced at 10:30 A.M. of Novem .. 
ber 21, 19 57, the trial Judge stated that on that morning 
on his way to the Courthouse he had driven his automobile 
to the intersection of Major Street and Cleveland Street 
in Salt Lake City where the collision occurred. That he 
had driven his automobile through the intersection and had 
stopped his automobile near the intersection and had esti--
mated the distances at which he could observe vehicles 
approaching the intersection upon the intersecting street. 
That he had observed the trees and house which were 
situated on the southeast or common corner between the 
approaching vehicles of plaintiff and defendant. That he 
h8d observed the widths of the streets and had driven on 
Major Street noting the problems of traversing each inter .. 
section as he crossed it. 
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That on the morning of November 21, 1957, prior 
to the arguments of counsel and at the time of the view 
taken by the Court the general weather conditions were 
good and there was no snow on the ground. That the 
"yield--right--of-way" sign was not placed at the intersection 
and against Cleveland traffic but there was placed a 
"stop sign'' against Major Street traffic. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING CONTRIBU--
TORY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PLAIN--
TIFF. 
Point II 
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Point III 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS PREVENTED FROM 
HAVING A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE OF IRREGULAR--
ITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT AND 
AN ABUSE OF DISCRET!r:)N BY THE COURT. 
ARGUMENT 
Points I and II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING CONTRIBU--
TORY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PLAIN--
TIFF. THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
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This auto collision occurred at an intersection which 
was controlled by a "yield--right--of--way" sign imposing the 
duty of yielding upon the defendant Partridge. The rights 
and duties of the drivers approaching and entering such 
an intersection have not been expressly defined by Utah 
decisions, but plaintiff relies upon the decisions of this 
court with reference to intersection having stop signs or 
semaphore control. 
The facts presented to the trial court for decision were 
that plaintiff was driving at 20 to 25 m.p.h. upon his 
approach to the intersection and at a position 25 or 30 
feet south of the intersection he observed defendant's 
vehicle which was slowing down and was at a rate of speed 
of approximately 15 miles per hour; that defendant's ve .. 
hide was 50 feet east of the intersection. Plaintiff testified 
that he was aware of the "yield" sign against defendant; 
that he looked to the west for traffic eastbound on Cleve· 
land Avenue; that he was first aware of danger when de .. 
fendant was even with the "yield" sign and as plaintiff's 
vehicle was just entering the intersection. 
When danger was first known to plaintiff he attempted 
to avoid the collision by gaining speed, but due to the 
snowy condition plaintiff was unable to avoid the colli.-
sion. 
It is important to note the position of the automobiles 
involved at the moment of impact and the point of impact 
in the intersection. The evidence clearly sho\\rs that the 
front end of the plaintiff's vehicle was even with the north 
edge l )f the intersection and that the front end of the de· 
fendant's auto collided with the middle of the right side 
of plaintiff's vehicle. This picture sho\ving that plaintiff 
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was clear of more than half of the intersection while the 
front of defendant's vehicle had not traversed even half 
of the intersection. 
Plaintiff contends that defendant has not shown that 
plaintiff is negligent in any respect. Plaintiff acknowledges 
that he had the duty of keeping a proper lookout and of 
driving at a safe speed for the existing conditions and of 
maintaining control over his motor vehicle. There is no 
proof that he has breached any of these duties. All the 
evidence shows that plaintiff conducted himself as an or~ 
dinary safe and prudent driver should under the circum~ 
stances. The evidence shows that he observed the defen~ 
dant at the first opportunity and that what he saw would 
indicate to every reasonable person that the defendant 
was going to yield. The speed of plaintiff is not shown 
to be excessive under the circumstances. 
The plaintiff takes the position that under the cir~ 
cumstances presented in this case that he had a right to 
rely on the "yield" sign and to rely upon defendant to 
yield to him and that he did everything in the operation 
of his vehicle that an ordinary, careful, prudent person 
would do for his own safety under the circumstances. In 
the present situation the "yield" sign together with the 
speed and approach of the defendant constituted an in~ 
vitation to the plaintiff, who was approaching the inter~ 
section on the through highway so close to the intersection 
as to constitute an immediate hazard to any vehicle who 
was at or near the intersection on Cleveland Avenue, to 
proceed on through the highway. 
Sherman v. Hall, ... N.Y. 158 N.E. 16 
Schleuder v. Soltow, Minn. 59 N.W. 2d 320. 
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The defendant, the disfavored driver, had the clear 
duty to yield to the favored driver, the plaintiff, and until 
the plaintiff was otherwise put on notice, he could presume 
that the defendant would yield to him and permit him 
to pass. 
Bates v. Burns, Utah ... 281 P 2d 209 
Martin v. Stevens, Utah ... 243 P 2d 747 
Walker v. Peterson, Utah ... 278 P 2d 291 
41.-6.-72.10 ... Utah Code annotated 1953. 
Point III 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS PREVENTED FROM 
HAVING A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE OF IRREGU .. 
LARITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT 
AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE COURT. 
Plaintiff refers to the statement of facts concerning 
the conduct of the trial court judge in viewing the inter .. 
section where the collision between plaintiff and defendant 
occurred. The trial judge went to the scene at a time when 
there was no snow on the ground which presents a dif, 
ferent situation than that which existed upon the morning 
of the collision. There being heavy snow freshly fallen 
upon the morning and at the time of the collision. The 
traffic controls were different at the time of the judge's 
visit from those existing at the time of the collision in 
that a stop sign had been subsequently erected for Major 
Street traffic. Further, there is no showing that physical 
evidence which would demonstrate an obstruction upon 
the southeast corner of the intersection was similar or 
different from the time of the collision. 
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There clearly is a proper time for the trial judge sitting 
as the trier of fact to view the scene of an auto collision 
when such is the subject of a law suit. Plaintiff argue~ 
that the proper time and proper circumstances are me 
when evidence is being taken, when parties to the law SlllL 
have notice and opportunity to object and when partie~ 
may be represented at the viewing. In the matter here 
taken on appeal the trial judge saw fit to go to the scene 
of the collision and take evidence by estimating distances 
and observing whether or not there was an obstruction and 
observing the widths of the streets. The trial judge viewed 
the intersection without counsel for either side making 
a motion that such view be made and said viewing was 
made without notice to either counsel that there would 
be a view taken of the scene. Further, the trial judge viewed 
the intersection after both parties had rested this case and 
before counsel had argued their respective case. 
Plaintiff most strongly urges this court that a trial 
judge in determining the facts concerning a matter on trial 
before him is required to observe the same limitations as 
the juror would. The trial judge must evaluate the evidence 
properly brought before him and he must not, as a juror 
must not, upon his own volition proceed to a scene of a 
collision and there take evidence upon which he decides 
a case. 
Brown v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 
Ga., ... 82 SE 2d 12 
Nead v. DiLeva, N.Y .... 66 NE 2d 174 
Greenberg v. City of Waterbury, Conn., ... 167 
A 83 
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Conner v. Parker, Tex .... 181 SW 2d 873 
Atlantic and Broglam Ry. Co. v. City of Cordele, 
Ga., ... 54 SE 155 
Wall v. U. S. Mining Co., Utah ... 232 F 613 
Noble v. Kertz and Sons Feed and Fuel Co., Cal. 
... 164 p 2d 257 
The California Court in Noble v. Kertz case, above 
cited, stated clearly the contention of plaintiff when it 
made the following statement concerning a substantially 
identical problem. "To sanction such a rule would be to 
permit a trial judge to take evidence outside of court, with .. 
out the parties or their counsel being present, and would 
effectively deprive a litigant of his constitutional right of 
an appeal. Such a rule would amount to a denial of due 
process, and certainly would deny to a litigant the fair and 
impartial trial to which he is entitled." 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Provo River Water Users 
Assn. vs. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 133 P 2d 777 in con .. 
sidering a case where a juror, during the trial, had a con.-
versation with a witness, made the following statement: 
''The purpose of a trial of the issues is to have the facts 
determined impartially and fairly by a court or jury. 
Jurors as well as judges must base their verdicts or decisions 
on the evidence presented during the trial, not on the 
basis of some independent personal investigation or deter.-
mination of the facts outside of court.'' 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff is entitled to a fair trial and he is en.-
ti tied to know that the evidence considered by the court 
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was evidence that was properly and fairly presented to 
the court. In the present case there is no ascertaining what 
observation and measurements were made by the trial 
judge beyond those acknowledged to counsel after the 
viewing and prior to argument. Plaintiff respectfully sub--
mits that he was deprived of a fair trial by the irregularity 
in the court proceedings and the abuse of discretion by the 
trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WARREN M. O'GARA, 
Counsel for Appellant 
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